Grismer Case Factum

Court File No. 26481

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(Appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal)

BETWEEN:

TERRY GRISMER (ESTATE)

Appellant
(Respondent)

-and -

BRITISH COLUMBIA COUNCIL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(MEMBER DESIGNATE TOM PATCH)

Respondent
(Respondent)

-and -

BRITISH COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK
COUNCIL OF CANADIANS WITH DISABILITIES
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO

Interveners
(Responent)

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FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER
COUNCIL OF CANADIANS WITH DISABILITIES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: STATEMENT OF FACTS

PART II: POINT IN ISSUE

PART III: ARGUMENT

ISSUE 1 - The Duty to Accommodate

ISSUE 2 - Bona Fide and Reasonable Justification

PART IV ORDER SOUGHT

PART IV: LIST OF AUTHORITIES

PART 1 - STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Intervener accepts the Statement of Facts as set out in paragraphs 1 through 33 of the Appellant' Factum.

2. In order to drive safely, a driver must be able to see the objects within the relevant field in a timely manner.

3. In British Columbia, the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles (the "Superintendent") is responsible for ensuring that, before a license is issued, the individual is fit and able to operate a motor vehicle safely. While the Superintendent has the authority to establish standards for fitness by regulation, no regulations exist. Instead, the Superintendent and the employees of the province's Motor Vehicle Brach ("MVB") rely on the standards contained in the "Guide for Physicians in Determining Fitness to Drive a Motor Vehicle," (the "Physician's Guide").

   Reasons for Decision, Member Designate, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3, p. 404.

4. The standards in the Physician's Guide, which are relevant to the later Mr. Grismer's ("Grismer") case, are diagnostic rather than functional. Under the heading, "Field of Vision," it states that, "both a homonymous and a bitemporal hemianopsia are incompatible with driving a motor vehicle of any class." Under "Horizontal Field of Vision" it imposes a requirement of 120 degrees with both eyes examined together for the class of license for which Grimser had made application. The diagnostic rest for peripheral vision measures a person's field of vision with no eye or head movements.

   Reasons for Decision, Member Designate, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3, p. 405.

5. Although the peripheral vision standard of 120 degrees had, on occasion, been relaxed, it had never been relaxed for persons with Grismer's disability (homonymous hemianopsia).

   Reasons for Decision, Member Designate, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3. pp. 405-406.

6. Many jurisdictions do not rely on a diagnostic field of vision standard to determine eligibility for a motor vehicle license. Grismer would have qualified for a license in great Britain, Holland, Finland, Japan and at least thirty (30) states in the United States.

   Reason for Decision, Member Designate, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3, pp. 418-419 and 421.

7. Some persons with visual field loss are able to successfully compensate by frequent eye and head movements. In a functional study, submitted by the Respondent, eye and head movements were permitted. Test subjects were assessed on their ability to detect various sizes of objects across the relevant field area, and their reaction times. According to the study, a minority of those tested demonstrated a "capacity to compensate for their defect".

   Accid. Anal. and Prev., Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 331 (the "Swedish Study"): Appellant's Factum, Tab 2.

8. Prism glasses allow those persons who are able to master them to shift the location of their visual field by moving their eyes only, rather than having to turn their head. Grismer had mastered the use of prism glasses. Dr. Wilkinson, an expert called by the Respondent, agreed with the Appellant's expert, Dr. Pozza, that Grismer was benefiting from the use of the prism glasses.

   Reasons for Decision, Member Designate, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3, pp. 412-413 and 416.

9. The Superintendent did not assess Grismer's capacity to compensate for his visual disability through eye or head movements. He did not assess whether Grismer's use of prism glasses would enhance his ability to be fit and able to operate a motor vehicle safely. There was no evidence that the Respondent seriously assessed any of Grismer's individual abilities, other than his ability to meet the prescribed standard (i.e. the diagnostic tests in the Physician's Guide).

   Reasons for Decision, Member Designate, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3, pp. 424-425.

10. The Member Designate decided:

    I am not persuaded that the Respondent has met its burden of demonstrating in an objective sense the visual field standards as they are applied by the M.V.B. are reasonably necessary.

    He found that the evidence currently available did not warrant the Respondent's application of a blanket exception. The diagnostic standards applied were not demonstrated to correlate with the functional ability to drive. Nor was it established that an individual assessment would not be a reasonable alternative. He refrained from establishing a process to assess Grismer's individual ability to drive safely, but retained jurisdiction to establish one, if the parties were unable to agree. He did conclude that the 120 peripheral vision standard was a reasonable threshold for determining who required a visual field assessment. With reference to such an assessment, he noted the existence of "appropriate driving simulators" and "meaningful" in car tests. He did not consider the "limited" availability of simulators or the "expense" of road tests to warrant their not being considered by the Superintendent.

    Reason for Decision, Member Designate, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3, pp. 423-425 and 426-427.

    Evidence of Dr. Wilkinson, Appellant's Record, Vol. 1, p. 142.

11. Mr. Justice Williamson of the Supreme Court of British Columbia found the Member Designate had properly applied the bona fide and reasonable justification defence. He further found no unreasonable finding of fact amounting to an excess of jurisdiction.

    Reasons for Judgment, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Appellant' Record, Vol. 3, p. 440.

12. The Court of Appeal held, " …there is not a shred of evidence that testing is a practical or feasible alternative [to the diagnostic tests in the Physician's Guide]." The court further held that once it is established that an individual testing is impractical, " …there is no obligation to accommodate an individual within the affected group."

    Reasons for Judgment, Court of Appeal, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3, pp. 457-458 and 475.

    PART II - POINTS IN ISSUE

13. Did the Court of Appeal err when it held there is no duty to accommodate in cases of direct discrimination?

14. Did the Court of Appeal err when it reversed the decision of the Member Designate that the Superintendent had not discharged the onus upon him of justifying his prima facie discriminatory action as bona fide and reasonable pursuant to s. 3 of the Human Rights Act (S.B.C. 1984. c. 22) ("the Act")?

    PART III - ARGUMENT

15. For better or worse, ours is a car-dominated culture. The Court is invited to take judicial notice of the importance of holding a license to operate a motor vehicle to a person's full participation in this society. One's ability to earn a living, select a place to live and to move independently will be restricted if a person is not entitled to drive. Moreover, barriers which exclude some persons with disabilities from using other modes of transportation make those who are excluded that much more dependent upon use of the private automobile.

16. It must be acknowledged that there are people who are unable to operate a motor vehicle safely because their vision is impaired. However, it must also be acknowledged that both visual ability and safety are relative. No one has 360 degree peripheral vision and few activities are without their inherent risks.

17. Human rights legislation provides a mechanism for balancing the competing claims of public safety and individual mobility.

    ISSUE I - The Duty to Accommodate

18. In human rights law, "direct discrimination" refers to practices or rules that discriminate on their face. "Adverse effects discrimination " involves rules and practices which are neutral on their face but which impose obligations, penalties and or restrictive conditions not imposed on others because of some special characteristic of the protected group.

    Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpson-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 551.

19. Direct and adverse effects discrimination equally infringe human rights legislation and violate equality rights guaranteed under s. 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

    Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 at 986.

    Commission Scholaire Regionale de Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525 at 541.

    Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at 549.

    Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute) S.C.C. File No. 25856 June 17, 1999 at para. 84.

20. Notwithstanding the equal status accorded direct and adverse effects discrimination, this Court has bifurcated the defences available to respondents. In cases of adverse effects discrimination, the only defence available would be that a complainant could not be accommodated or that the accommodation would cause the respondent undue hardship. Direct discrimination is subject to the bona fide occupational qualification )"BFOQ") or bona fide and reasonable justification (BFRJ") defences, with no obligation to accommodate.

    Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 489 at 517.

21. As was noted by Mr. Justice Sopinka in the Central Alberta Dairy Pool case, the bifurcated defence was applied notwithstanding the express wording of the statute:

    First, the statute makes no distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. Second, the BFOQ applies equally to all forms of discrimination.

    Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), supra at 525.

22. Canada, Ontario, Manitoba and the Yukon Territories have statutorily imposed duties to accommodate in cases of direct discrimination, as part of BFOQ or BFRJ defences. This Court has not yet decided whether the reasoning in the Central Alberta Dairy Pool case requires a "rewriting of the statute" in cases of direct discrimination covered by human rights statutes in these jurisdictions.

    Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1998 c.9 s.2 and 15(2) and (8).

    Human Rights Code of 1981, R.S.O. 1990 C.H. 19 s. 17(2) and 25(2).

    The Human Rights Code, L.M. 1987-88, c. 45 s.9(1).

    Human Rights Act, S.Y. 1987, c. 3, s. 7 (1).

23. It is submitted that within the requirements imposed by the Charter, Parliament and legislatures should be free to enhance human rights protections for their citizens.

24. The Member Designate decided that the Superintendent directly discriminated against Grismer by imposing a blanket exception based on the diagnostic standards in the Physician's Guide. Had the Superintendent overzealously applied a functional test, which disproportionately screened out persons with visual disabilities, this could have been a case of adverse effects discrimination. Moreover, application of a diagnostic test to a person who is denied the use of a prosthetic device (e.g. visual aid) when taking the test arguably results in a case of both direct and adverse effects discrimination.

25. Human rights tribunals and courts have had difficulty agreeing on whether a particular practice discriminates by adverse effect or directly. If the two types of prima facie discrimination are difficult to distinguish, it begs the question of whether the bifurcated defence is worth maintaining.

    Canada Human Rights commission v. Toronto-Dominion Bank (1998), 32 C.H.R.R. D/261 (F.C.A.) (Appellant's Book of Authorities, Tab 8).

26. The bifurcated defence has been subjected to widespread criticism as the Court heard in the Miron case. In addition to the commentators cited in paragraphs 62 through 74 of the Appellant's Factum, can be added the following:

    The Duty to Accommodate: A Purposive Approach," (1992), Can. Lab. Law Journal 1 at 17-18.

27. The bifurcated defence has created confusion for human rights boards of inquiry and conflicting lines of authority, causing boards to question the relevance of the distinction.

    Thwaites v. Canada (Armed Forces) (1993), 19 C.H.R.R. D/259 at D/282 (Can. Trib.).

    Nijjar v. Canada 3000 Airlines Ltd., Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Decision No. 3/99 (unreported), dated July 9, 1999 at 27-28.

28. The Court has consistently held that human rights legislation is to be interpreted purposively. The three assumptions relied upon by the majority in the Central Alberta Dairy Pool case to justify the bifurcated defences should be assessed against this measure:

    1. the respondent's motives are more likely to be reprehensible in cases of direct discrimination;

    2. direct discrimination harm groups, while adverse effects discrimination tends to harm individuals; and

    3. the appropriate remedy in cases of direct discrimination will be the disallowance of the rule or the practice, but in adverse effects cases the rule or practice will continue with modifications to accommodate the individual or minority.

    Central Alberta Diary Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), supra at 514-16.

    A. Motivation

29. This Court has held that human rights legislation exists to remove discrimination not to punish anti-social behaviour.

    Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84 at 90

30. Proving the intention of a person responsible for action with a discriminatory effect can be highly problematic, particularly when the discriminatory rule or practice is neutral on its face.

    Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpson-Sears, supra at 549.

31. There is a subjective element to the BFOQ and BFRJ defences, which is not part of the undue hardship defence where accommodation is required. Leaving aside the issue of remedy, it is difficult to see why discriminatory motivation should produce differing results depending on whether the rule or practice is facially neutral. Arguably, bad faith reliance on a neutral rule or practice is more reprehensible because if is more difficult to expose.

    Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202 at 208.

32. Even if the assumption is valid, the obligation to accommodate could be more onerous than striking down the rule or practice. This would be an anomalous result, given the purpose underlying bifurcation.

    Can. Lab. Law Journal 23 at 36.

    B. Groups v. Individuals

33. It is submitted that adverse effects discrimination will regularly harm groups. This Court has recognized as much when it came to use the terms systemic discrimination and adverse affects discrimination interchangeably.

    Canadian National Railway v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 at 1138.

    Taylor and Western Guard Party v. Canadians Human Rights Commission, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 at 931-32.

34. Conversely, individuals can be harmed by direct discrimination. To illustrate, it would have been inconsistent with the purposes of human rights legislation to apply a visual standard for determining eligibility for a motor vehicle licence without permitting the person to use a prosthetic device, which would enable the person to meet the standard. Moreover, it would be harsh to totally deny a person a motor vehicle licence if granting a restricted licence (e.g. restricted to daytime driving only) would adequately address public safety issues.

    C. Restricting Remedies

35. Remedies should reflect the purposes underlying human rights legislation as a whole, and not be dictated by the type of defence which a respondent can assert.

    Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), supra at 93-94.

36. Remedies can prevent future discrimination as well as respond to the grievance of the individual or group which launched the initial complaint.

    Canadian National Railway v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), supra at 1141-42.

37. In this case the Member Designate did not simply strike down the visual field standard. Instead, he held it could be used as a threshold for determining who would be subjected to individualized testing. Because it was a case of direct discrimination, the Court of Appeal held that the respondent was entitled to a clear decision on the defence of bona fide and reasonable justification.

    Once it is established there is no obligation to accommodate an individual within the affected group. A compromise was not an available outcome because requiring individual treatment defeats the purpose of the statutory defence.

    Individual visual field testing of all drivers in British Columbia may well be "impractical", not to mention pointless, but for those with visual field deficits it makes perfect sense. Fashioning a remedy involving an accommodation of those with visual field deficits, without striking down the visual field standard, is entirely consistent with the goals underlying human right legislation of removing unnecessary barriers and according equal treatment for each individual.

    Decision of the Court of Appeal, Appellant's Record, Vol. 3 at 457-58.

    Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), supra at para. 90.

38. The concept of accommodation, following the Central Alberta Dairy Pool decision, has been restricted to according differential treatment to members of protected groups who are adversely affected by a respondent's rule or practice. In the Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education that "integration was the preferred accommodation" and "the norm of general application" for persons with disabilities within the education system. Where an inclusive solution can be found, it is generally going to be preferable to a "special" or "segregated" one, all other things being equal. For example, ramping a building's front entrance is more dignified than requiring a person in a wheelchair to enter through the loading dock.

    Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), supra at 516-17.

    Large v. Stratford (City), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 733 at 750-51.

    Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 at 273-74.

    Ontario Human Rights Commission, Guidelines for Assessing Accommodation Requirements for Persons with Disabilities, (Toronto: Ministry of Citizenship, 1989) as reprinted in (1992), 1 Can. Lab. Law Journal 186 at 190-91.

39. It follows that the issues of defence and remedy should be separated. Individual accommodations and differential treatment may address most concerns arising in religion complaints, where differences are inevitable, if not desirable. This is not necessarily true in the case of disability, where the goals are inclusion and full participation. These goals may not be appropriate or realizable in every case. Where an inclusive solution would impose undue hardship, an interim individualised solution may not. Defences should be narrowly construed, and remedies applied which are as consistent with the removal of discrimination to the extent possible without causing undue hardship.

    Commission de droits de la personne), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279 at 307.

    Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), supra at 90-94.

40. The only time when a board or systemic consideration of undue hardship should be considered at the defence rather than the remedy stage was identified by Mr. justice Sopinka in the Central Alberta Dairy Pool case. Where a comprehensive accommodation policy exists which could be frustrated or undermined by granting a complainant an individual accommodation it would be legitimate to consider those broader implications as a defence.

    Central Albert Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), supra at 529.

    D. Conclusion

41. Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that while Grismer experienced direct discrimination, it was appropriate for the Member Designate to have considered the accommodation of a diagnostic threshold leading to an individualised functional assessment. It would also have been appropriate to have found that Grismer should have been accommodated by being assessed while wearing prism glasses and, if the facts warranted, that he be issued a restricted licence requiring that he wear those glasses It is submitted that the statutory BFRJ defence in s.3 of the Act includes, rather than displaces, a duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. It is further submitted that the duty to accommodate means taking positive action to meet the needs and circumstances of persons with disabilities. It should not be limited by the words "individual" or "reasonable". Nor should it necessarily require differential treatment or be non-inclusive.

    Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 680-81.

    Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), supra at para. 83-84.

    ISSUE 2 - BONA FIDE AND REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION

42. When interpreting human rights legislation a broad and purposive interpretation consistent with the elimination of discrimination should be used.

    Ontario Human rights Commission v. Simpson-Sears supra at 547.

    Canadian National Railway v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), supra at 1134.

43. It follows that exceptions or defences to a finding of discrimination should be interpreted narrowly so as to avoid frustrating this purpose.

    Commission des droits de la personne), supra at 307.

44. The Respondents argue that at paragraphs 55-57 of their factum that the BFRJ defence in s.3 of the Act should be read in the context of s.1 of the Charter. In particular they submit that s.3 should be read more broadly when considering the prima facie discriminatory conduct of a public respondent than would be conduct of a private respondent. While much of s.15 jurisprudence has been developed by drawing upon human rights jurisprudence, it is submitted that the Charter and human rights legislation need not produce identical results in every case. Assuming human rights legislation meets standards imposed by the Charter, it should be open to legislatures to raise human rights standards in order to accelerate the process of eliminating discrimination.

45. In this case, the Member Designate commented at length about the lack of evidence connecting the visual field standard with the goal of protecting the public interest in denying motor vehicle licences to those incapable of driving safely. The Intervener adopts the submissions of the Appellant at paragraphs 80 through 90 of its factum in concluding that the diagnostic visual field applied by the Superintendent could not "necessarily be justified with respect to each individual".

46. Further, it was acknowledged by the key witness for the Respondents that alternative visual field tests exist which functionally assess the ability of persons with visual field impairments to drive safely in real life or simulated driving. Dr. Wilkinson, the Respondents' medical expert, testified that Grismer could be individually assessed on whether "he is or is not coping appropriately with that particular situation [i.e. the safety risk associated with a visual field impairment]." The alternatives he identified were "an extremely long road test" or "an extremely sophisticated simulator, which really does simulate real driving….". He testified about the cost of purchasing one such simulator, and expressed the opinion that the toad test was not "practical".

    Appellants' Record Vol. 1 at 142.

47. It is submitted that the real issue in this case was whether the Superintendent discharged the onus upon him of demonstrating that amongst the possible alternate methods of assessment, none was "practical". The Court of Appeal held that, " …there is not a shred of evidence that testing is a practical or feasible alternative." It also took exception to the Member Designate's use of the word "possible" in relation to the use of an individual assessment. All parties agree that the Member Designate accurately identified the applicable law in this case. In particular it is agreed that the quoted test from the Saskatoon Firefighters case is the binding authority.

48. As stated by Williamson J. in the Supreme Court of British Columbia:

    …a reading of the member designate's reason discloses he was contemplating "an examination of reasonable alternatives to a blanket exception" (p. 32).

    The Member Designate was aware that there would be costs involved in using a simulator or a road test, but nevertheless held:

    I am not persuaded the Respondent has met its burden of demonstrating in an objective sense the visual field defects as they are applied by the M.V.B. are reasonably necessary.

    His decision was reached on the evidence before him. He concluded his decision by indicating that future evidence may someday justify a blanket exception and included reference to "a realistic and affordable simulator."

49. The Member Designate applied the proper test, was clearly aware of all the evidence and found the Respondent failed to discharge the onus upon it. The Court of Appeal erred when it suggested the onus was on the Complainant to prove a practical or feasible alternative existed. It further erred when it stated there was no evidence to support the Member Designate's finding. To reach its conclusion, the Court of Appeal would have had to establish a legal test which defines when the costs of the individual assessments rendered them impractical or unreasonable. It did not do so. Instead, it took the evidence about cost and decided it fell on the wrong side of a line it did not identify.

50. Before seeking a decision that the costs of an individual assessment were impractical, the Respondents should have to explain why simulators could not be purchased; why B.C. applicants could not have been sent out of province to be tested; or why applicants should not have been permitted to bear this cost, or the cost of extended road testing, themselves: (assuming it would have been unreasonable to expect the province to pay). Because the costs of providing income support to unemployed persons with disabilities fall largely on provincial governments, a proper cost analysis should also consider the potential impact of denying a licence to a person who, if properly assessed, could drive and maintain employment. As the evidence in this case indicates, lack of a driver's licence is an important systemic barrier to the employment of persons with disabilities. The onus of proving no practical alternative existed was on the Superintendent. He failed to discharge it.

    Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Saskatoon (City) [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1297 at 1313-14.

51. The Member Designate carefully and accurately reviewed the evidence, applied the correct test and reached a conclusion which is entitled to deference. No jurisdictional error was committed. There was simply a finding the Respondent had failed to bring itself within the BFRJ defence. This was a decision which is squarely in the areas of fact-finding and adjudication in a human rights context "where this Court has recognized the superior expertise of human rights tribunals."

    Canada (Attorney-General) v. Mossop [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 at 585.

    Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta, supra at 528.

    PART IV - ORDER SOUGHT

52. The Appellant respectfully requests that this Honourable Court:

    1. allow the appeal; and

    2. reinstate the award of the Member Designate, or alternatively, in the event the Court finds a new test is to be applied in cases of direct discrimination, refer the matter back to the Member Designate for further consideration.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Dated July 29, 1999 at the City of Toronto, Ontario

_____________________

David Baker

_____________________

John C. Plater

Solicitors for the Intervener,
Council of Canadians with Disabilities

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes

Canadian Human Rights Act S.C. 1998 c.9. s.2 and 15(2) and (8).

Human Rights Code R.S.O, 1990 c.H. 19 s.17(2) and 25(2).

The Human Rights Code, L.M. 1987-88 c.45, s.9(1).

Human Rights Act, S.Y., 1987, c.3, s.7(1)

Case Law

Ontario Human rights Commission v. Simpson-Sears Ltd. [1985] 2 S.C.R.

Central Okanagan School District No 23 v. Renaud [1992] 2 S.C.R.

Commission Scholaire Regionale de Chambly v. Bergevin [1994] 2 S.C.R.

Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R.

Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute) S.C.C. File No. 25856 June 17, 1999

Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R.

Canada Human Rights Commission v. Toronto-Dominion Bank (1998), 32 C.H.R.R. D/261 (F.C.A.)

Thwaites v. Canada (Armed Forces) (1993), C.H.R.R. D/259 (Can. Trib.).

Nijjar v. Canada 3000 Airlines Ltd., Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Decision No. 3/99 (unreported), dated July 9, 1999.

Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board) [1987] 2 S.C.R.

Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Etobicoke [1982] 1 S.C.R.

Canadian National Railway v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114.

Taylor and Western Guard Party v. Canadian Human Rights Commission [1990] 3 S.C.R. 89

Large v. Stratford (City) [1995] 3 S.C.R.

Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education [1997] 1 S.C.R.

Brossard v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne) [1988] 2 S.C.R.

Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 S.C.R.

Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Saskatoon (City) [1989] 2 S.C.R.

Canada (Attorney-General) v. Mossop [1993] 1 S.C.R.

Articles and Texts

William Pentney, "Belonging: The Promise of Community-Continuity and Change in Law 1995-96," (1996), 25 C.H.R.R. C/6 at C/11.

David Lepofsky, "The Duty to Accommodate: A Purposive Approach," (1992) Can. Lab. Law journal 1 at 17-18.

Anne Molloy, "Disability and the Duty to Accommodate", (1992),

Can. Lab. Law Journal 23 at 36.

Ontario Human Rights Commission, Guidelines for Assessing Accommodation Requirements for Persons with Disabilities, (Toronto: Ministry of Citizenship, 1989)